INTRODUCTION
The internationalisation of new and small firms has been a longstanding concern of researchers in international business (Coviello and McAuley 1999; Ruzzier et al. 2006 ). This topic has been re-invigorated over the last decade by the burgeoning literature on so-called 'born globals' (BG) or 'international new ventures' (INV) -businesses that confound the expectations of traditional theory by being active internationally at, or soon after, inception (Bell 1995; Rialp et al. 2005; Aspelund et al. 2007 ). Until quite recently, this literature had not really considered how the home regional environment of a new venture might influence its internationalisation behaviour. However, a handful of recent studies have shown that being founded in a geographic industry 'cluster' can positively influence the likelihood of a new venture internationalising (e.g. Fernhaber et al. 2008; Libaers and Meyer 2011) 1 . This paper seeks to build on these recent contributions by further probing the relationship between clusters and new venture internationalisation. Specifically, taking inspiration from recent work in the thematic research stream on clusters (which spans the fields of economic geography, regional studies and industrial dynamics), the paper explores how the emergence and internationalisation of new ventures might be affected by the 'cluster life cycle' context within which they are founded. This issue is examined through a revelatory longitudinal case study of Ireland's indigenous software cluster. The study investigates the origins and internationalisation behaviour of 'leading' Irish software ventures but, in contrast to many existing studies, it seeks to understand these firms within the context of the Irish software cluster's emergence and evolution through a number of 'life cycle' stages.
The empirical case study highlights differences between the origins and internationalisation behaviour of two cohorts of 'leading' new ventures, founded at different stages of the Irish software industry's cluster life cycle. These differences are attributed to two main factors.
Firstly, the regional entrepreneurial environment in Ireland by the late 1990s -when the Irish software cluster had become more established -was significantly different and more favourable than that prevailing in earlier years. Thus, some of the resources that are known to be useful for early and rapid internationalisation (e.g. venture capital, experienced executives and supportive institutions) were relatively abundant by this time. Secondly, many of the leading firms founded in the established cluster of the late 1990s had superior internal resources and capabilities at inception, by comparison with firms founded in earlier stages of the cluster life cycle, due to the extensive prior experiences (primarily within the cluster) of their founding team members. Hence these firms were particularly well-placed to capitalise on the improved regional entrepreneurial environment and to identify and exploit emerging niche opportunities in global software markets. Consequently, the internationalisation of this latter cohort of new ventures was qualitatively different from that of firms founded during earlier stages in the cluster life cycle, being (generally) earlier, more rapid, wider in geographic scope and more 'multi-modal'. This evidence adds to recent work showing that the home regional environment (i.e. being located in a cluster) can influence new venture internationalisation behaviour, and further extends it by highlighting how this influence can change over time (i.e. at different stages of the cluster life cycle). Accordingly, future studies should probably pay more attention to the wider geographic context within which BG/INVs emerge and take a longitudinal perspective on their development in that context.
3
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the most salient contributions from the (largely disconnected) thematic literatures on new venture internationalisation and clusters. The case study method and data sources are then explained.
The fourth section of the paper introduces the case context before the fifth presents the case study evidence on new venture creation and internationalisation at two different stages in the Irish software industry's cluster life cycle. The conclusion then emphasizes the contribution, reviews the key findings and considers the study's limitations and wider implications.
KEY POINTS FROM THE LITERATURES ON NEW VENTURE INTERNATIONALISATION AND CLUSTERS
Resource-based perspectives on new venture internationalisation 2 A key concern of the research stream on the BG/INV phenomenon has been to understand why some new ventures are able to rapidly internationalise, often to multiple global regions, contrary to the predictions of established internationalisation theories (e.g. Uppsala School).
Traditionally, new and small firms have been seen to face multiple disadvantages that curtail or slow their international expansion, sometimes referred to as the liabilities of newness and smallness. From the resource-based perspective (RBV), new and small firms are often portrayed as resource deficient by comparison with larger and more established firms. Thus, studies of small firm internationalisation have sought to distinguish between non-exporters and exporters on the basis of their respective resource endowments (Westhead et al. 2001 ).
This theme has been further developed in recent work on the BG/INV phenomenon, which has suggested such firms are distinguished from non-exporters and gradual internationalisers 4 by their possession of superior resources (including various types of knowledge) and capabilities at inception and by their subsequent ability to successfully acquire and mobilise external resources (Rialp et al. 2005; Coviello and Cox 2006; Gabrielsson et al. 2008) .
Some explanations of the BG/INV phenomenon have pointed to the enabling role of structural changes in global markets or the rise of the Internet and e-business, whilst others have focused on the use of distinctive international marketing strategies and business models by these firms ). However, it is the characteristics of BG/INV founding team members and top managers that have attracted the most attention, especially in studies adopting a resource-or knowledge-based perspective. Thus, Gabrielsson et al. (2008) observe that most of principal resources of these firms at start-up are likely to be 'embodied' in these key individuals. Importantly, these resources (including knowledge resources) have often been accumulated and developed during prior work experiences, especially overseas or with internationally-active firms (Bloodgood et al. 1996; Reuber and Fischer 1997) .
Among the various types of 'embodied' resources and capabilities thought to be useful for early and rapid internationalisation are: knowledge of new and emerging technologies; deep familiarity with vertical markets and potential customers; entrepreneurial and leadership experience; and familiarity with effective business models and organisational routines. The role of networks is another recurrent theme in studies of BG/INVs. Coviello and Cox (2006, 117) have observed that "networks both generate resources and are a resource in their own right". Several studies have highlighted the way in which BG/INVs acquire crucial resources for early internationalization from external network actors, by using the existing network ties of their founders but also by effectively developing new networks (Laanti et al. 2007; Loane et al. 2007 ). Finally, financial resources have been found to be important in several empirical studies of BG/INVs. Early and rapid internationalization is said to require significant 'up front' investment, for example to fund new product development and international marketing efforts. Thus, access to superior financial resources (via venture capital) has been found to distinguish firms who are 'born global' (rapidly expanding into global markets) from those who are 'born international' (Gabrielsson et al. 2004) . Venture capitalists may also assist early internationalization by providing reputation resources, new knowledge and additional network ties (Fernhaber and McDougall-Covin 2009) .
Insights from the clusters literature
Most studies in the BG/INV literature are silent on the geographical context for new venture creation and internationalisation (Crone 2012) . In particular, the extant literature has not explored the geographical context for the resource inheritance and acquisition that is described in resource-based perspectives. However, the fact that recent studies have shown that a cluster location can positively influence new venture internationalisation (e.g. Fernhaber et al. 2008; Libaers and Meyer 2011) should encoruage international entrepreneurship scholars to take a closer look at clusters research stream, which has been one of the hottest areas in social science in recent decades. The discussion here focuses on four key themes from this literature that might provide useful insights for research on new venture internationalisation 3 .
Knowledge and learning within clusters
Economic geographers' views on industry clusters traditionally drew upon Marshall's (1890) concept of agglomeration economies. Subsequent work in economic geography and regional studies has moved to a focus on knowledge and learning among clustered firms and the 6 associated benefits for innovation and competitiveness (e.g. Keeble et al. 1999; Malmberg and Maskell 2002) . These approaches suggest clustered firms can benefit from knowledge dissemination and 'collective learning' which are fostered through various mechanisms, including: flows of professionals and "embodied expertise" through the local labour market;
high rates of localised entrepreneurship (including spin-offs from existing businesses); formal and informal networking by professionals and managers; and demonstration/imitation effects.
More recent studies have provided a more nuanced view of the benefits of clustering; for example, Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos (2009) have shown that certain firms are better able to capitalise on the knowledge spillovers and learning advantages available within a cluster due to their greater 'absorptive capacity'.
Clusters as 'habitats' for entrepreneurship
Another strand in this research stream has explored their role as beneficial environments for new venture creation and growth. Regions differ in the way they can sustain new businesses due to the uneven geographical distribution of information and other knowledge necessary for firm formation and business success (Malecki 2002 Bergman 2008; Menzel and Fornahl 2010) . Studies of cluster evolution and clusters at different stages in their life cycle have observed that the presumed benefits of a cluster location (as discussed above) may be present when a cluster is fully established but absent during the early stages of its emergence (Bresnahan et al. 2001; Feldman 2001) , and also that cluster advantages (such as agglomeration economies) may fade or even reverse if a cluster reaches maturity/stagnation (Potter and Watts 2010) . This research cautions us to consider that the alleged beneficial impacts of a cluster location for new venture internationalisation may be contingent of the life cycle stage of the cluster -an issue that forms the central argument in this paper and a key focus in the empirical case study analysis. These studies have also highlighted the important role played by entrepreneurial agency in seeding clusters and driving the cluster through phases in its life cycle, noting that pioneering entrepreneurs can -through their business successes -bring about a transformation in the regional environment for entrepreneurship (Bresnahan et al. 2001; Feldman et al. 2005; Mason 2008 ).
Entrepreneurial dynamics within clusters
A final strand of interest in the clusters research stream is concerned with the microfoundations of industrial dynamics. A number of 'genealogical' studies have highlighted the 8 important role of localised spin-offs from incumbent firms in the growth of clusters (Klepper 2001; Dahl et al. 2003) . This spin-off process may become cumulative and reinforcing because most new firms are founded in the same geographical region as the firm that 'produced' the entrepreneur (Klepper 2001; Romanelli and Schoonhoven 2001; Dahl et al. 2003) . This implies that spin-offs and other forms of 'experience-based' entrepreneurship may account for an increasing share of the total firm population over time. Since the BG/INV literature has shown that experience can be positively related to internationalisation, we might expect to find more firms with the necessary experience for (early) internationalisation as the cluster progresses through its life cycle. This point is taken up during the empirical case study, along with the other themes discussed above.
METHOD
The empirical part of the paper is based on a revelatory, historical and longitudinal case study of new venture internationalisation within Ireland's indigenous software cluster. This case resonates with both literatures reviewed in the preceding section, since Ireland has been recognised as an emerging software development 'hotspot' in work on entrepreneurial technology clusters (Arora et al. 2004; Roche et al. 2008) Chronological analysis allows events to be traced over time and permits causal inferences to be drawn (Yin, 2009, p.148) . This approach was used to construct an account of the overall cluster life cycle 'story' and to draw inferences about the relationship between temporal changes in the cluster environment and the internationalisation behaviour of new ventures.
The case study is based largely upon in-depth, desk-based research using a wide array of firms that are of particular interest to this study.
A cluster life cycle perspective
In keeping with recent evolutionary accounts of clusters, the Irish indigenous software industry can be said to have progressed through a number of 'life-cycle' stages. Table 1 give an overview of this life cycle in four major phases from the late 1970s to the mid 2000s, highlighting the key characteristics of both the industry and the regional entrepreneurial environment at each stage. This summary has been informed by the author's own secondary research and reading of existing studies. In particular, Sterne's (2004) delimitation of five 'entrepreneurial generations' of Irish software firms was adopted. The key points to note from This chronological account leads to some important inferences and insights, which underpin the case study analysis that follows. Firstly, it seems neither the supportive regional environment observed by the late 1990s nor the deliberate policies and actions of the Irish
State were significant factors in the cluster's initial emergence, since both developments came after at least two entrepreneurial generations. Rather, entrepreneurial agency seems to have played a crucial role in the evolution of the cluster by 'inducing' the emergence of a more supportive regional entrepreneurial environment. This scenario echoes several other accounts in the literature on cluster emergence, evolution and life-cycles (e.g. Bresnahan et al. 2001; Feldman et al. 2005; Avnimelech and Teubal 2006) . It also suggests that a 'coevolutionary' perspective is appropriate, since entrepreneurial activities in the software industry both influenced, and were influenced by, the wider regional entrepreneurial environment in Ireland. New venture origins and internationalisation in the embryonic/emerging Irish software cluster
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CASE EVIDENCE ON NEW VENTURE INTERNATIONALISATION AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE CLUSTER LIFE CYCLE
Looking into the origins of the early Irish software product firms of Generation 3, it is clear that no single source of knowledge was being exploited and there was no dominant 'entry route'. The emergence of these firms can be attributed to the efforts of entrepreneurs who sought to capitalize on: (1) the knowledge and expertise they had gleaned from varied work experience in industry, academia and the public sector; and (2) Arora et al. 2004 ). These various routes are illustrated using some specific examples of leading Generation 3 firms in Table 2 .
The internationalisation behaviour and paths of these early software product firms are difficult to uncover in detail from secondary research. However, the available evidence tends to suggest that they either: (1) internationalised gradually, having initially focused on providing custom services to domestic customers; or (2) internationalised early due to a small or non-existent home market for their products, but progressed with a narrow geographical scope, typically focusing on the culturally-proximate UK or US markets. Thus, Sterne (2004, p.65) states, "the typical generation two company started as a service provider to local customers, wrote its first code as a sideline, re-positioned itself as a product developer after a few years" and generation three firms were "characterised by product specialisation, more frequent forays into America". Overall, there seem to be some similarities with the traditional Uppsala or stage models of internationalisation, and where firms were early internationalisers, the moniker 'born international' seems more appropriate than 'born global', since their exporting generally progressed quite slowly and narrowly. Certainly, the experiences of three leading Generation 3 firms (Euristix, Iona and Quay) are consistent with this interpretation (Table 2 ).
The regional entrepreneurial environment in the embryonic/emerging Irish software cluster New software ventures in Ireland faced a challenging regional entrepreneurial environment in the late 1980s/early 1990s and -viewed in the context of subsequent developments -this seems to have constrained or slowed the pace of their internationalisation. Seen from a resource-based perspective, the new Generation 3 start-ups look strikingly similar to the 'resource deficient' small firm of traditional portrayals; their founders typically had little capital and many had limited commercial experience, meaning they lacked the requisite financial resources and prior business experience to pursue an early and rapid international expansion strategy. However, these internal resource deficiencies were compounded by the absence of a supportive regional environment where external resources could be acquired or mobilised.
One problem within the regional environment was an under-developed labour market; there was a shortage of experienced software managers, sales personnel and, to a lesser extent, engineering talent. There was also an absence of supportive State institutions, at least untiland arguably beyond -the establishment of the National Software Directorate in 1991. The eight cases detailed in Table 3 exemplify this 'born global' tendency. All survived a global technology sector downturn as early-stage businesses and internationalised early and rapidly to distant markets and in multiple global regions, winning contracts with major 'blue chip' corporate clients. As of October 2009, three were still trading independently as 'micromultinationals' (one publicly-listed, two privately-held) some 10 to 13 years after their establishment, whilst five had been acquired after between five and 12 years of independent trading. All eight firms were founded by teams (of between two and seven founders) with significant prior experience, most of which was acquired working for earlier generations of firms in Stages I and II of the cluster life cycle. The new venture origin in all eight cases was one of three types: entrepreneurial spin-offs from successful incumbent firms (including some of the leading Generation 3 firms); serial entrepreneurship; or new entrants with very experienced founding teams (Table 3) . It is suggested here that these origins and antecedents
were an important causal factor behind the internationalisation behaviour observed among the eight firms, since they conveyed a particular and significant 'resource inheritance' on these new ventures, embodied in their experienced founders. The resources in question were things like technological domain knowledge, managerial and entrepreneurial experience, international marketing and market development experience in a variety of countries, and 18 deep familiarity with particular vertical markets and end users -all of which might be useful for early and rapid internationalisation. Table 4 exemplifies this point for three of the eight cases from Table 3 . Thus, seen from a resource-based perspective, the leading Generation 4 firms were in a superior position at inception compared to earlier generations of Irish startups and this partly explains why they were able to pursue a qualitatively different internationalisation trajectory to their predecessors.
A transformed region entrepreneurial environment in Stage III (the established cluster)
This section highlights some important contrasts between the regional entrepreneurial environment facing new software ventures in late 1990s, and that of the late 1980s/early 1990s (described earlier). The central point is that the regional environment had substantially improved by Stage III, as a result the gradual process of co-evolution described earlier in the paper and summarised in Table 1 . This transformed regional environment provided many useful resources and supports for new ventures. In particular, some of the resources that are known -from the BG/INV literature -to be useful for early and rapid internationalisation (e.g. venture capital, experienced executives and supportive institutions) became relatively abundant by the late 1990s. Thus, the new software ventures of the late 1990s/early 2000s -including those cases in Table 3 -were able to (externally) acquire and mobilise some of the additional resources they required for early and rapid internationalisation from within the cluster. This undoubtedly encouraged and enabled several leading Generation 4 firms to pursue of a 'truly born global' strategy. Three of the many important changes in the regional environment are discussed here by way of illustration. Table 3 received VC; together securing over €100 million in 18 separate deals, worth €2-15 million External validity is an inherent concern with all case study research, so we cannot be certain if these findings are specific to the Irish case or generalisable to other locations and industries. However, there do appear to be some parallels with the experiences of emergent technology clusters in Israel and Bangalore (Avnimelech and Teubal 2006; Nair et al. 2007 ).
Also, following Yin's (2009) assertion that case study research is concerned with generalisation to theory rather than populations, the conceptual links made here between new venture internationalisation and the cluster life cycle may have wider relevance. Overall, the paper suggests that a more holistic understanding of the born global/INV phenomenon could be developed by paying closer attention to the geographical and historical context with which these firms emerge. A longitudinal or co-evolutionary perspective that gives greater consideration to these contextual factors -looking before and beyond the life of a single venture or entrepreneur -might be a fruitful avenue for future studies. Note: entrepreneurial 'generations' are denominated according to Sterne (2004) .
Source: author, based on own secondary research and reading of existing studies (Coe 1997; O'Gorman et al. 1997; Ó Riain, 1997 and 1999; Sterne, 2004; Sands 2005; Roche et al. 2008 ). Founded by three former executives of leading Irish middleware firm Iona Technologies (cross-refer Table 2 ). Subsequently recruited three other key executives from Iona. Like Iona, it initially specialised in middleware systems built to the CORBA industry operating standard. Embodied knowledge and expertise transferred in spin-off included experience of developing and marketing component middleware products at Iona, plus experience in various managerial roles with this leading indigenous software exporter.
CR2
Founded in 1996 by Cian Kinsella and Ron Downey after they resigned from Kindle Banking Systems, an Irish banking software firm that they had previously co-founded and grown before selling it to UK Plc Misys. Kinsella gained extensive experience during his 17 years at Kindle, including product development, consultancy, customer service and sales; he had served as Kindle's Technical Director and Sales Director. Downey led Kindle into its first export market (UK in 1994) and had established Kindle's regional offices in Singapore, Bahrain and Miami as its Worldwide Sales Director in the early 1990s. CR2 appointed several experienced entrepreneurs/executives from within the cluster to its board in the early 2000s.
Openet Telecom
Established in 1999 with a pre-selected, highly experienced, senior management team of software and telecoms industry veterans, who had worked -in Ireland -for firms like Euristix (cross-refer Table 2 ), Retix/Vertel, ISR Global Telecom and Sun Microsystems. This background gave the firm a deep understanding of its target customers and emerging trends in the telecoms market. Barry Murphy, founder of Insight (a leading Irish software firm in the 1980s) and Ireland's first National Software Director (1988-96), was recruited as CEO at an early stage.
Source: compiled by author using information from company websites and various secondary data sources.
